Conclusions
For all those who envision tight leadership and clear decision-making structures as key factors behind successful political coherence, the conditions prevailing in Germany must seem like a nightmare. For one thing, there are multiple players and the chancellor, despite being the primus inter pares, must convince rather than command his or her team. On top of that, political processes are protracted, are based on consensus, and end in compromises that often (though not always) do less to achieve the stated goals than to satisfy party and power preferences or even personal vanities.
In the absence of an outright national foreign and security strategy that would establish a fundamental and goal-oriented framework for action, Germany’s networked approach still seems to be more about establishing ‘an equal footing’ or ‘a level playing field’ among relevant ministries. A case in point is the fact that there are three key documents in the field of crisis and conflict management in external affairs, each of which seems to highlight the specific responsibilities and ambitions of one of the three key players: the foreign (AA), defence (BMVg) or economic cooperation and development (BMZ) ministries.
During the drafting phase of the guidelines on preventing crises, revolving conflicts and building peace (Federal Government of Germany 2017), it became apparent just how much the three leading ministries were still demarcating and asserting their competences and decision-making sovereignty in relation to each other while struggling for recognition and leadership in the process. The BMZ, in particular, but also the BMVg contested the AA’s tight grip on coordination among the three bodies. Indeed, both the BMZ and the BMVg saw their contribution to international crisis management as being just as relevant as that of the AA given that the BMZ was implementing the majority of projects on the ground and the BMVg was guaranteeing a secure environment for such efforts. Even the title of the guidelines was long contested. In fact, to ultimately break the logjam, it was made longer so that every ministry could find itself represented, and the word “civil” was deleted so as not to implicitly indicate the absence of the military arm. After all, seeing that the term ‘networked security’ had already been dropped in favour of the more civilian-sounding ‘networked approach’, inserting ‘civil’ would have constituted the second affront to the BMVg.
Despite the ever-growing consensus in Germany that a well-functioning networked approach to crisis and conflict is required, it has yet to be seen to what degree the interministerial coordination bodies – whether reinforced or newly established by the 2017 guidelines – will ultimately succeed in meeting their goals. However, doubts about this success are raised by the fact that the actual day-to-day operational work related to managing external crises and conflicts is primarily carried out outside the newly established framework. Furthermore, the guidelines cannot obscure the fact that their focus is predominately on the civilian side of crisis and conflict management and does not cover the entire conflict cycle. This is in line with Germany’s previous involvements in EU-, UN- and NATO-led missions. With the exceptions of the Kosovo and Afghanistan missions, Germany’s contributions have predominantly been humanitarian or limited to advisory or support roles, such as monitoring, transport, training or surveillance via air or ship. In all these cases, fewer than 100 civil or military staff were seconded.
These days, however, Germany’s engagement is particularly focused on supporting reforms in the military- and civil-security sectors, as is shown by the support it is providing to the ongoing EUTM missions in Mali and Somalia and to the EUAM Ukraine. It can be assumed that Germany will maintain this level of commitment, particularly in the Sahel region, and is prepared to be similarly engaged in the Middle East, as well, should the course be set for ending the wars in Syria or Yemen. What would come as a real surprise (and would constitute a genuine paradigm shift) is if Germany were to take on the risks associated with leadership within the EU, NATO or the UN as well as to engage in peace-enforcing missions. As long as this is not the case, it must be said that Germany is failing to live up to the ambitions it set forth in the 2006 and 2016 white papers on security policy as well as underlined in many official speeches. Instead, the non-holistic nature of its approach shows once again how much the Nazi past still affects today’s policymaking. Indeed, despite all the new rhetoric to the contrary, Germany has so far failed to answer the question – and back it up with deeds – of what it means to assume more responsibility in an increasingly crisis-ridden world. Accordingly, the frustration among its partners – not only in the EU and NATO, but also in the UN – is unlikely to vanish anytime soon.