Germany Report

In the many documents that have underpinned Germany’s approach and have helped to continue developing it, there is not a single, standardised nomenclature regarding the unified approach under discussion. Instead, and even though all of them officially come from a single source (i.e. the federal government), the documents bear the signature of the specific ministry (or sometimes ministries) they originated in. The range of terms used have included, among others, the modifiers “cross-departmental” and “networked” and the noun “whole-of-government approach” (WGA). For example, the 2017 guidelines (Federal Government of Germany 2017), which is the most recent related document, introduces “interministerial” for national-level coordination whereas the multilateral dimension is captured under the heading “international partnerships”. Last but not least, in the coalition agreement of the current ‘grand coalition’ government (Federal Government of Germany 2018: 20), the concept is summarised under “comprehensive and networked approach”, which makes this phrase seem to be the term that all ministries and the ruling parties (CDU, CSU and SPD) have been able to agree upon.

This phenomenon of having too many cooks in the nomenclature kitchen, so to speak, hints at just how coherent (or incoherent) a coherence policy might get in Germany. The decentralised federal administration grants ministries a high degree of autonomy in terms of management, policymaking and implementation. In this system of diffuse leadership, even the Chancellery is only the primus inter pares. In other words, despite being the most important body for coordination, its steering powers are weak in terms of execution. However, whenever responsibilities for policies are shared and relate to cross-cutting issues, decision-making relies exclusively on cooperation and negotiation regarding which procedural rules of the federal government will apply. To make this process run more smoothly, there are two inter-departmental coordination mechanisms. The first mechanism is somewhat negative, as it enshrines what is commonly known as turf battling. In this case, policies are developed in one ministry, then successively checked and amended by other ministries, and then adopted (or not) in the federal cabinet. The second, which is more ambitious as well as used to a certain extent in the realm of crisis and conflict management, is positive in that it involves jointly drafting policies in specially established inter-departmental formations.

Despite the lack of consistence terminology discussed above, it is nevertheless evident that all German federal ministries that have traditionally been involved with external affairs have embraced the coherence agenda and are actively participating in further developing the approach. Federal ministries dealing with justice, education, the environment, health, social and cultural issues, migration, economic matters, food, gender and trade policies are also included, as the related documents underline through many cross-sectoral references. In fact, all ministries have been invited to join the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention, which has been the central coordination structure of the networked approach since it was launched by the action plan of 2004 (Federal Government of Germany 2004).

The AA plays a prominent role in the triad of the traditional external actors. All crisis- and conflict-related issues as well as related cooperation with other ministries are centred in the AA. The Di- rectorate-General for Humanitarian Assistance, Crisis Prevention, Stabilisation and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, created in March 2015 after a review of German foreign policy, is in charge of these tasks. This so-called Directorate-General S (D-G S) has 150 diplomats and a considerably increased annual budget of EUR 3 billion at its disposal (which also includes humanitarian aid). Unlike before, the AA now has an outright operative role within the new coherence policy framework in that it designs and implements its own projects. These projects focus on front-loaded stabilisation measures lasting a maximum of one year, which allows for an immediate and likewise more political reaction. The operational role now assumed by the AA serves two purposes at once: In addition to being able to take early action before a crisis manifests itself, it aims to prove to its international partners that Germany is meeting their demands to take on more responsibility. What’s more, the AA has established the offices of special representative for crisis prevention and one for humanitarian aid within the D-G S to enhance the public visibility of its policies.

When it comes to international commitments and coordination with the EU, the picture is not quite so simple. For obvious reasons, the AA’s European Directorate-General is in charge of overseeing and coordinating all EU-related policies. It has a special unit for foreign and security policy and crisis prevention (which, of course, raises the question of how this unit relates to the new D-G S unit for crisis prevention). Then there is the Political Directorate-General 2, whose EUCOR unit is tasked with coordinating CFSP and CSDP policies as well as interactions with three Brussels-based organisations: the European Union’s Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Commission’s Directorate-General for External Relations (RELEX), and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of the Council of the European Union. Contrary to what one would expect, responsibility for all matters related to the EU’s integrated approach to external crises and conflict management is bundled in this political directorate- general rather than in the DG-S.

Among the AA’s actors is the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF), which is the ministry’s implementing organisation for recruiting, training, preparing, deploying and supporting civilian experts for peace operations, such as observing elections, mediation and democracy promotion. At present, the non-profit company has a pool of over 1,000 experts.

The civilian orientation of German crisis responses has long given the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) a key role in managing peacebuilding and human-security efforts. It has done so by taking a long-term, structural approach and by developing tailor-made budget lines and a sophisticated administrational structure, such as its own crisis early warning system. Since 1999, it has maintained its own pool of experts, the Civil Peace Service (ZFD). Together with the GIZ, Germany’s society for international cooperation, it also commands a long-established technical implementing organisation, whose over 20,000 members are active in 120 countries worldwide. Without question, the BMZ has the greatest experience and resources available to design and implement projects aimed at combating poverty, building social and economic infrastructure, or promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, the BMZ recently overhauled its structures and created a whole new directorate-general, called ‘Marshall Plan with Africa: Displacement and Migration’, in the belief that conflict prevention is best served by fighting the root causes of conflict and migration. This directorate-general also houses the division (223: Peace and Security, Disaster Risk Management) responsible for all aspects of networked security policy, which represents the BMZ on the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention (discussed above).

The primacy of the German approach’s civilian orientation to crisis and conflict management has (as expected) had the opposite effect on the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg), which has been rather sidelined. Nevertheless, its contributions to Germany’s prevention approach have increased over the years in the area of security-sector reform (SSR) and post-conflict reconstruction, most recently with the just published strategy on these issues (Federal Government of Germany 2019b). In fact, owing to its roughly three decades of deployments on multilateral missions abroad, the BMVg is perhaps the ministry that requires the least convincing regarding the usefulness of a coherence approach. In terms of soldiers deployed and mission duration, the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan stand out. However, these were under the command of civilian organisations rather than the armed forces (the Bundeswehr).

The white papers of both 2006 (BMVg 2006) and 2016 (Federal Government of Germany 2016) place the Bundeswehr unconditionally within the larger context of an increasingly networked security architecture in which military instruments take a back seat to civilian ones. Of note is the fact that the 2016 white paper talks more about the need for civil-military coordination than does the 2017 development report (BMZ 2017). Furthermore, with the Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation of the Bundeswehr in Nienburg, Lower Saxony, the BMVg has created its own competence centre for civil-military cooperation in missions abroad. The centre supports a wide range of similar initiatives on both the multinational and civil society levels. An example of the former is its annual hosting of NATO’s biggest CIMIC exercise (‘Joint Cooperation’), and an example of the latter is the centre’s recent engagement in the ‘Common Effort Community’ network.

In the course of implementing the networked approach, the BMVg has also changed its ministerial setup. In Political Department 1, which deals with security and defence policy as well as the management of all directorate-generals of the BMVg, a separate unit (Pol I 5) has been created for networking security measures and interacting with academia and civil society. In addition, two units have been set up in Political Department 2, which focuses on strategy development, operations and arms control. The Pol II 1 unit deals explicitly with the basics of networked security policy and represents the BMVg in the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention. The second unit (Pol II 5) deals with the Enable and Enhance Initiative (discussed in greater detail below).

Let us now turn from horizontal interministerial cooperation to vertical coordination involving Germany’s lower house of parliament (the Bundestag) and civil society. Germany’s constitution gives the Bundestag a strong position in foreign and security policy. For example, without a mandate from the Bundestag, the Bundeswehr cannot take part in missions abroad. Politically, however, this position is rather weak, as the public and the media (the direction of causality can be debated) have tended to show little interest in foreign and security policy issues. Indeed, it must be stressed that political careers in Germany are made (and broken) in the realm of domestic politics. In any case, since 2010, parliamentary monitoring and control of Germany’s coherence agenda has been exercised by the Subcommittee on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management and Integrated Action. Perhaps due to its small size, the subcommittee seems to have developed a working relationship that transcends mere party allegiance. For example, in its hearings, it has presented a very united front to members of the executive branch and, in doing so, it has also indirectly contributed to fostering more interministerial coordination in preparation for such hearings.

Turning to civil society, for historical reasons, the peace movement has been particularly strong in Germany. Its political roots lie in the environmental Green Party and the far-left Left Party, but also in the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). Strictly speaking, one should speak of distinct development and peace movements. However, since the objectives of both movements overlap for the most part in terms of advocating a purely values-based peace policy and rejecting force as an acceptable means in conflict transformation, one can speak of a single ‘peace community’ organised into two major platforms: the umbrella organisation of development and humanitarian aid NGOs in Germany (VENRO) and the German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management. Furthermore, the churches play a particularly prominent role in the developmental organisations. Indeed, their influence on the framing of Germany’s coherence approach has been – and will continue to be – both far-reaching and profound, and the ‘rebranding’ of the German approach from ‘networked security’ to a more neutral and peace-friendly ‘networked approach’ can primarily be attributed to their lobbying. In addition, there are a number of think tanks with close ties to the ‘peace community’. Their research likewise focuses on the peaceful resolution of conflicts and arms control. What’s more, there is not a (visible) ‘strategic community’, such as the one used to characterise Anglo-Saxon discourses on peace and security.